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"Rebus Redux": The Potential Utility
of Fundamental Change of
Circumstances Doctrine to
Enforce Human Rights Norms
Introduction
The all-too-frequent news of government atrocities across the globe'
starkly highlights the failure of the international community to enforce
human rights norms effectively. Failure almost certainly stems from a
reluctance of States, individually and collectively, to hold violating
States accountable for human rights abuses. 2 Even if a concerned State
is willing to take action, few meaningful measures are available under
international law.8 A concerned State contemplating sanctions against a
treaty partner has traditionally faced a particularly difficult dilemma. On
the one hand, the State might impose sanctions on its treaty partner,
while at the same time continuing to perform its treaty obligations. In
such a scenario, the concerned State remains tainted by its continuing
legal ties to an objectionable regime. Alternatively, the concerned State
could breach the treaty, distancing itself from the violating State and
reinforcing the political and economic effects of the sanction. Breaching
an international obligation, however, has many costs. Breach tears at
1. For example, between 1975 and 1978, Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge govern-
ment murdered four million Cambodians. Deathwatch: Cambodia, TIME, Nov. 12,
1979, at 42. Under the Amin and Obote regimes, Uganda has tortured and slaugh-
tered approximately 400,000 citizens and alleged political enemies. See, End ofa Mon-
ster, AMERICA, Apr. 28, 1979, at 344; Toward Ceaseless Chaos, TIME, May 4, 1981, at 42.
The slaughter of hundreds of Hutu tribesmen by the Burundi Army in August, 1988
provides a recent example of State-sponsored killings. See Perlez, Army May Have
Added to Revenge in Burundi, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1988, at A8, col. 1.
2. See Watson, The Limited Utility of International Law in the Protection of Human
Rights, AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 1, 3 (1980):
Recent history has shown only too clearly that while there might be some
verbal condemnation, there seldom is any tangible action sufficient to make a
State act differently. The world tends to stand by as governments slaughter
the political opposition, native populations on desirable land, or racial
minorities.
3. See Henkin, Human Rights and "Domestic Jurisdiction", in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 29, 31 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977). "The
effort to create an international law of human rights has been largely a struggle to
develop effective machinery to implement agreed norms. Arduous effort has not
brought forth machinery of notable effectiveness." Id.
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the fabric of international law. Moreover, the injured State may file an
international legal action for reparations or take a variety of coercive
countermeasures. 4 As a means of encouraging treaty partners to adhere
to human rights norms, neither approach is satisfactory.
A recent application of the international law rules that govern treaty
termination provides a possible solution to this dilemma, and may more
effectively protect human rights. In December, 1982, the military
authorities of Suriname 5 murdered fifteen members of the political
opposition. In response, the Netherlands suspended its long-term
development aid treaty with its former colony on the grounds that these
human rights violations constituted a "fundamental change of circum-
stances" that justified suspension or termination of the treaty under
international law. 6 The Netherlands offered to resume performance
only if Suriname gave sufficient guarantees for the protection of human
rights and respect for the rule of law. 7
The Netherlands's decision to invoke the fundamental change of
circumstances doctrine (also called "rebus sic stantibus")8 instead of
merely breaching the treaty marked the first time that a State has
4. A State injured by another State's breach of an international agreement is
entitled to take one or more forms of available self-help measures: reprisals, recipro-
cal measures, or retorsion. L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAw 541-42 (2d ed. 1987).
Reprisals are countermeasures, otherwise considered illegal under international law,
taken by one treaty member in reaction to a prior illegal act by another treaty
menber. Id. at 541. Legal reprisals must evidence both necessity under the particu-
lar circumstances and proper proportion to the injury suffered. Id. at 542. The
necessity requirement would leave an injured State unlikely to take reprisals in
response to a mere breach of an agreement. Reciprocal measures refer to a decision
by an injured State not to perform its obligations to the breaching State when the
obligations are directly linked to the breach. Id. at 541. The injured State will almost
certainly resort to reciprocal measures in response to another State's breach of a
treaty. Retorsion refers to those countermeasures taken regardless of a breach, but
which are generally permissible under international law. Id. at 542. These measures
may include suspending diplomatic relations, cessation of trade, or curtailment of
immigration from the offending State. Id. at 548.
In addition to self-help measures, the injured State may file an action to receive
reparations for damages caused by the breach. Id. at 552-54. Types of damages
awarded in a suit for reparations include restitution or expectancy damages but do
not include punitive or exemplary damages. See id.
5. Suriname is also referred to as "Surinam" in many texts.
6. Lindemann, The Repercussion Resulting from the Violation of Human Rights in Suri-
nam on the Contractual Relations Between the Netherlands and Suriname, 44 ZEITSCHRiFT FOR
AusLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES REcHT UND VOLKERRECHT 64, 92 (1984) (English sum-
mary of German language text).
7. Id. In response, Suriname denied that a fundamental change had occurred,
Bossuyt & Griffiths, Report of a Mission: Human Rights in Suriname, 30 REV. INT'L
COMM'N OF JURISTS 52, 61 (1983), and denounced the Netherlands' action as an
unlawful intervention into its internal affairs. Lindemann, supra note 6, at 92.
8. The relevant Latin maxim is "conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus"
which translates approximately to "every [agreement] must be understood to hold
only while things remain in the same State." A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 681
n.1 (1961).
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attempted to apply this much discussed 9 but rarely invoked' doctrine
based on a treaty partner's human rights violations. Today, the develop-
ment aid treaty remains suspended without the Netherlands having paid
reparations.
This Note will examine the legality and the wisdom of allowing
human rights violations to serve as grounds for invoking the fundamen-
tal change of circumstances doctrine to terminate or suspend treaties. It
will examine both human rights law and fundamental change of circum-
stances doctrine, considering the doctrine as a potentially powerful tool
in the narrow class of cases to which it applies. The Note will use the
actual facts of the Suriname/Netherlands dispute, a paradigm case for
legitimate application of the doctrine, as a foundation for its analysis.
I. Background of the Suriname/Netherlands Dispute
A. Surinamese Independence and the Development
Cooperation Plan
Suriname is a small tropical country located on the northeast coast of
South America"1 populated by approximately 350,000 inhabitants.1 2
Suriname was a Dutch possession for over 300 years, first as a colony
and, after 1948, as a self-governing unit of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands with a locally-elected representative Parliament.' 3 Since colonial
times, Suriname had benefitted from a peaceful social and political envi-
ronment free from State-sponsored human rights problems. 14 In 1972,
the Dutch government initiated a series of conferences to discuss Suri-
9. See I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 192-96 (2d
ed. 1984): "All international lawyers are aware of the pitfalls surrounding the appli-
cation of the [doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances] and the controver-
sies which have raged as to its admissibility as a ground for the unilateral
denunciation or termination of a treaty." Id. at 192. Significant recent contributions
to the scholarly literature on the subject include A. DAVID, STRATEGY AND TREATY
TERMINATION 1-55 (1975); A. VAMvOUKOs, TERMINATION OF TREATIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 2-216 (1985); Haraszti Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances,
146 RECUEIL DES COURS 1 (1975-I1); Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances
(Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 895 (1967); and Toth, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic
Stantibus in International Law, JURIDICAL REVIEW 56, 147, 263 (1974). Toth's three-
part article provides a superb comprehensive analysis of the history and scope of the
doctrine. SINCLAIR, supra at 193-96, provides a succinct overview of the doctrine.
10. A. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 9, at 61-117 and 153-84. Vamvoukos records
approximately 50 instances since 1955 in which parties or courts implicitly or explic-
itly raised the issue of whether changing circumstances justified terminating or modi-
fying a treaty. States have only invoked the doctrine twice since 1968: in the 1973
Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases before the International Court of Justice, discussed infra, at
notes 106-08, and in the Suriname/Netherlands dispute.
11. E. DEW, THE DIFFICULT FLOWERING OF SURINAM 1 (1978).
12. Bossuyt & Griffiths, supra note 7, at 62.
13. See Bos, Surinam 's Road from Self-Government to Sovereignty, 7 NETHERLANDS Y.B.
INT'L L. 133-34 (1976). England controlled Suriname for most of the period between
1799 to 1816. See id. at 133.
14. See E. DEW, supra note 11 for an overview of Surinamese history.
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name's eventual political independence. 15 The talks focused on attribu-
tion of Surinamese nationality, treaty succession, future diplomatic
representation, institutionalization of development cooperation, and
other diverse matters. 16 Dutch legislators found the absence of a
Surinamese constitution protecting the human rights of its citizens to be
a major obstacle to a final grant of independence. 17 Only after a
Surinamese leader gave adequate assurances that Suriname would enact
a State constitution prior to independence did the motion to sever the
remaining legal ties obtain sufficient votes in the Dutch Parliament.' 8
On November 25, 1975, Suriname and the Netherlands signed a
series of treaties which, among other things, legalized Suriname's status
as an independent nation.' 9 One treaty outlined the terms of a develop-
ment cooperation plan20 under which the Netherlands placed a total of
3.5 billion guilders at the disposal of Suriname for ten to fifteen years,
together with 350 million guilders already committed.2 1
15. Id. at 135-36. The talks also involved the possible independence of the
Netherlands Antilles.
16. Id. at 133.
17. See E. DEw, supra note 11, at 189: "Dutch opposition legislators insisted that
the protection of human rights in Surinam was the responsibility of the Dutch under
the Kingdom Statute, and that there must be assurances from the Surinam Govern-
ment that a new constitution would be in place before independence could be voted
on.,
18. Id. at 189-90. The Surinamese Parliament enacted the new constitution by
unanimous vote on November 19, 1975, almost one week before the date set for
Suriname's independence from the Netherlands. Regarding the debates over the
content of the new constitution, "members of both government and opposition
benches generally applauded the wide-ranging list of fundamental human rights
guaranteed in the preamble and first nineteen articles." Id. at 191. Concerning the
constitutional debates generally, see id. at 190-96.
19. For more information on the various treaties concluded on November 25, see
Bos, supra note 13, at 140-53.
20. Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, no. 140 (1975).
21. See Bos, supra note 13, at 145. In summary, the treaty and protocol create the
following framework of Netherlands-Suriname development cooperation:
(1) The basis of the cooperation is a development plan, produced by Suri-
name in 1975. The object and purpose of the plan is the enhancement of
Suriname's economic strength, the promotion of employment, the improve-
ment of social conditions for the entire population and the development of
outlying districts.
(2) Each year, Suriname prepares a development scheme and submits it to a
Joint Consultative Committee composed equally of representatives from the
Netherlands and Suriname. If the Committee cannot decide on the appropri-
ateness of a proposed program in the development scheme, the subject mat-
ter is referred to the two governments for consultations.
(3) In addition to the Netherlands' cash contributions, Surinamese savings,
and Netherlands' technical assistance, help from other donor countries, orga-
nizations, and private investments will supplement the development plan's
implementation.
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B. Suspension of Development Cooperation Assistance
On February 25, 1980, a group of non-commissioned officers in the
Surinamese Army led a successful coup d'tat against the constitutionally
established government. 22 The military authorities appointed a new
civilian government, but retained ultimate political authority.23 Fueled
in part by instances of human rights misconduct-including arbitrary
arrests, mistreatment of detained persons, and suppression of freedom
of the press 24 -- various Surinamese interest groups held a series of pro-
tests seeking return to democratic rule. 25 On December 8-9, 1982, in an
apparent attempt to force an end to the protests, military authorities
arrested sixteen protest leaders2 6 and shot all but one.2 7 Observers tes-
tified that nearly every corpse showed signs of severe torture.28 On the
same day, the army razed two radio stations, a newspaper office, and the
building which housed the largest trade union in Suriname.29
The Netherlands government responded on December 10 when it
announced its decision to suspend the development cooperation pro-
gram.3 0 In a diplomatic note dated December 16, the Dutch govern-
ment asserted that circumstances prevailing in Suriname differed
fundamentally from the circumstances existing at the moment the two
governments concluded the development treaty, that the contracting
parties did not foresee this change, and that circumstances prevailing at
that time were an essential precondition for completing the program.3 1
The Surinamese military authorities stated in rebuttal that the purpose
of the development cooperation plan was merely to accelerate the social
and economic development of Suriname and that its social-economic sit-
uation had not fundamentally changed.3 2
II. Traditional Responses to a Treaty Partner's Human Rights Violations
A. Overview of International Efforts to Protect Human Rights
Since the end of World War II, the international community has focused
its efforts to secure human rights primarily on promulgating a series of
international instruments designed to enumerate and make binding a
22. Bossuyt & Griffiths, supra note 7, at 53.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 58-59.
25. Id. at 54-55.
26. For information on the prominent roles that each of the arrested played in the
pre-incident protests, see id. at 53-55. The 16 consisted of fourjounalists, four law-
yers, two university teachers, two businessmen, two trade unionists and two army
officers. Id. at 55.
27. Id. at 55-56. Out of the 16 arrested, only trade-unionist Fred Derby survived.
28. Id. at 56. See also The Report of the Dutch Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The
Events in Paramaribo, Suriname, 8-13 December 1982, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1983/55.
29. Bossuyt & Griffiths, supra note 7, at 55-56.
30. Id. at 60.
31. Id. at 61.
32. Id. For a summary of the object and purpose of the treaty, see supra note 21.
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broad range of human rights norms.3 3 United Nations sponsored
efforts include the U.N. Charter,3 4 the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,3 5 the twin Covenants on Civil and Political Rights ("CCPR"),3 6
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("CESCR"),37
and a host of multilateral conventions regulating specific violations such
as racial discrimination, s apartheid,3 9 genocide, 4 0 and torture.41 Other
human rights treaties have been promulgated by regional organizations
such as the Council of Europe,4 2 the Organization of American States,43
33. A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 60-61 (2d ed. 1982).
34. U.N. CHARTER. For provisions in the Charter related to human rights, see,
e.g., art. 1, para. 3; arts. 13 and 55; and art. 76, § c.
35. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 43 (1948). The U.N. General
Assembly intended the Declaration to set forth a body of rights which would serve as
"a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations." Id. at Preamble. It
was adopted 48-0 with eight abstentions (South Africa, Saudi Arabia and most of the
Eastern Bloc). The Eastern European States have since expressly accepted the Decla-
ration in the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at
986. While enacted as a non-binding instrument, the Declaration has produced "a
marked impact on the pattern and content of international law and [acquired] a status
extending beyond that originally intended for it." Survey of International Law, Report by
the Secretary-General, at 196, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/245 (1971), reprinted in L. SOHN & T.
BUERGENTHAL, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 522 (1973).
36. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966). As ofJuly 1, 1986, 84 States have ratified or acceded to the CCPR.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, (R. Lillich ed. 1986), at 170.39. In
addition, 32 States have ratified an Optional Protocol to the Covenant that creates a
more rigorous complaint procedure.
37. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966). As ofJuly 1, 1986, 89 States have ratified or acceded to the CESCR.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 36, at 180.18.
38. International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, adopted Dec. 21, 1965, 60 U.N.T.S. 195. As of July 1, 1986, 126 States have
ratified or acceded to this convention. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS,
supra note 36, at 160.24.
39. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of The Crime
of Apartheid, 28 U.N. GAOR SuPP. (No. 30) at 166, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974). As of
July 1, 1986, 82 States have ratified or acceded to this convention. INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 36, at 421.7.
40. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. As ofJuly 1, 1986, 96 States have
ratified or acceded to this convention. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS,
supra note 36, at 130.11.
41. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, 39 U.N. GAOR SuPP. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984). As of July 1, 1986, 41 States have ratified or acceded to this convention.
42. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (All 21 members of the
Council of Europe have ratified the Convention. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 36, at 500.1.) and European Social Charter, signed Oct. 18,
1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (As of July 1, 1986, 14 States have become parties to the
Charter. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 36, at 520.1.).
43. American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (English 1975). As
ofJuly 1, 1986, 19 States were parties to the Convention.
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and the Organization of African Unity,4 4 and by private groups, most
notably the International Labor Organization. 45
These various agreements seek to protect a panoply of individual
and group rights.4 6 Human rights treaties such as the U.N. Charter, the
Covenants, and other U.N. and regional conventions are directly bind-
ing on signatory States.4 7 Some norms contained in human rights
agreements may bind non-signatory States as reflecting customary inter-
national law. 48
B. Approaches to Enforcing Human Rights Norms
1. Complaint Provisions in Human Rights Agreements
Virtually all human rights agreements contain at least some provision
for addressing alleged violations by signatory States.49 Therefore, if the
concerned State and the violator State are both parties to the same
human rights agreement, the concerned State may respond to violations
44. African [Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27,
1981, 21 I.L.M. 58. As of 1986, 10 member States have ratified the charter; ratifica-
tion of more than half of the 50 members of the OAU will bring the Convention into
force. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 1038.
45. For an overview of the work of the I.L.O., see generally Valticos, The Interna-
tional Labour Organization in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 363-
95 (K. Vasek rev. Engl. ed. 1982); Wolf, Human Rights and the International Labour
Organization in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE LEGAL AND POLICY
ISSUES 273-99 (T. Meron ed. 1984).
46. The CCPR, for example, the cornerstone of the U.N. human rights effort,
protects political rights such as the right to life, freedom from torture and inhuman
treatment, and right of assembly. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). In contrast, the CESCR preserves social rights such
as the right to form and join trade unions, the right to strike, and the right to social
security. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
The U.N. conventions governing specific rights spell out these and other rights in
greater detail. The regional systems' protection of rights largely parallels those enu-
merated in the U.N. treaties, see L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 1027, 1034-35, while the
I.L.O.'s 100-plus conventions focus on labor and other social conditions.
47. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 10 (B. Hannum ed. 1984). See Szabo, Historical
Foundations of Human Rights and Subsequent Developments, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMEN-
SiONS or HUMAN RIGHTS 34 (K. Vasek ed. 1982): "States undertake, by ratifying con-
ventions on human rights to: respect the clauses they contain; take adequate
measures to maintain or establish a State of affairs postulated by the conventions;
and provide for a particular system of appeal for the benefit of citizens."
48. Article 38 of the statute of the International Court of Justice states that a
source of international law is "international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law." Article 38(1)(b). The Restatement lists the following types of vio-
lations as contravening customary international law: genocide, slavery, murder, or
causing disappearance of individuals, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, system-
atic racial discrimination, and "consistent patterns of gross violations of internation-
ally recognized human rights." See RESTATEMENT (REviSED) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1986).
49. See generally Sohn, Human Rights: the Implementation and Supervision by the United
Nations, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 379-84 (T. Meron ed. 1984) (dis-
cussing procedures for dealing with inter-State complaints).
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by filing a complaint in accordance with the appropriate treaty provi-
sion. For example, the CCPR provides that State parties may file a claim
with a Human Rights Committee established by the Covenant if it
believes that another party has not fulfilled its treaty obligations. 50 The
Committee,5 1 or in some cases an ad hoc Conciliation Committee, then
initiates a fact-finding and dispute resolution process and makes non-
binding recommendations to help settle the case.5 2 Implementation
provisions in most other human rights agreements are similar to the
CCPR procedures described above; however, some agreements, such as
the Genocide Convention, 55 provide for International Court of Justice
jurisdiction over Convention-related disputes.5 4
Complaint provisions in human rights agreements suffer from
important limitations. With the notable exception of the European Con-
vention, 55 virtually no international convention provides for any form of
coercive sanction to force a violating State to cease its treaty violations.
Instead, the fact-finding and conciliation procedures merely inform the
violating State that a treaty partner is concerned about the violations.
Moreover, despite the largely symbolic nature of the procedures, con-
cerned States seldom file complaints because of fear of States abusing
the complaint process for political purposes. 56
2. ECOSOC's Human Rights Commission
States may also file complaints with the U.N. Economic and Social Coun-
cil's ("ECOSOC") Commission on Human Rights. In 1970, the General
Assembly empowered the Commission to receive complaints of human
rights violations and to report on situations which evidence a "consis-
tent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms."'5 7 After receiving such a complaint, the Com-
mission may either consider the matter itself or, with the consent of the
50. CCPR, supra note 36, at art. 41. In order for the Committee to receive a com-
plaint, the alleged violating State must first recognize the competence of the Com-
mittee to do so. In order to file a complaint, the complaining State party must first
itself recognize the competence of the Committee to hear claims against it. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at art. 42(1)(a).
53. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
supra note 40, at art. 9.
54. For discussion of other conventions which submit disputes to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, see Sohn, supra note 49, at 379-80.
55. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, supra note 42. Under the Convention, States or individuals may
file complaints with the European Commission on Human Rights about alleged viola-
tions. Id. at art. 25. After fact-finding, the Commission may forward the complaint
plus its recommendations to the Council of Ministers for action on an inter-State
level or to the European Court of Human Rights for binding adjudicative settlement.
Id. at arts. 31, 48.
56. Shelton, International Enforcement of Human Rights: Effectiveness and Alternatives,
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 6, 11 (1980).
57. E.S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. E/4832/ Add. I at 8 (1970). See also Sohn, supra
note 49, at 386.
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accused State, refer it to an ad hoc committee for investigation. 58 The
Committee or ad hoc committee must subject all complaints to an exten-
sive fact checking process. All information must be kept confidential
unless and until the Commission decides to make a recommendation to
the ECOSOC. In addition to the above described procedures, the Com-
mission has established working groups to investigate human rights alle-
gations in specific areas, such as South Africa, Chile and the Israeli
occupied territories.5 9
The great advantage of the Commission's procedures is its absence
of a precondition that the violating State be a signatory of any human
rights agreement. However, the system has several drawbacks. The
confidential nature of the fact investigation prevents the proceedings
from placing significant public pressure on the violating State. Indeed,
the Commission has produced only one report for public scrutiny since
its inception. 60 In addition, the Commission has avoided making rec-
ommendations regarding certain protracted and egregious violations,
such as in Uganda and Cambodia, 61 the situations most deserving of the
Commission's attention.
3. Security Council Measures
States may also petition the U.N. Security Council to take action against
a violating State. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter grants the Security
Council the power to take economic or even military action against a
State whose actions constitute a "threat to peace, breach of peace, or act
of aggression." 62
The Security Council procedure, however, is fatally flawed. Sub-
stantive decisions require the unanimity of the Council's five permanent
members-the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United
Kingdom, and China.6 3 In practice, such unanimity has proved impossi-
ble to achieve,6 4 and the Security Council has not significantly furthered
the cause of human rights.
58. Sohn, supra note 49, at 386.
59. See generally, Sohn, supra note 49, at 386-89. Based on the Commission's rec-
ommendations or lead from the working groups, the General Assembly has con-
demned human rights violations in Chile and the Israeli-occupied territories. Id.
60. See id. at 391-92. The Commission publicly criticized Malawi for prosecuting
Jehovah's Witnesses.
61. Id at 389. For information regarding the violations in Cambodia and
Uganda, see supra note 1. For criticism and suggested reforms of the Commission's
work, see Sohn, supra note 49, at 391-92.
62. U.N. CHARTER, art. 39. See also U.N. CHARTER, arts. 41 (regarding severance
of economic and diplomatic relations) and 42 (regarding military action).
63. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 680.
64. In the human rights area, the Security Council has only acted twice, ordering
economic sanctions against Rhodesia, S.C. Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR (1428th mtg.) at
5, U.N. Doc. S/DV.1428 (1968), and South Africa, S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR
(2046th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/DV.2046 (1977), on the grounds that their apartheid
systems constituted a threat to peace.
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4. Unilateral Political and Economic Sanctions
Individual States also respond to another State's human rights violations
by taking any number of political or economic actions unilaterally. 65
Examples of political steps include speaking publicly against the State,
halting immigration or travel from the State, and suspending diplomatic
relations altogether. Breaching a particular treaty may also be viewed as
a political action. Examples of economic actions include embargoes and
boycotts.
Political sanctions can be effective in exerting public pressure on a
violator to conform its behavior to international law norms. Economic
sanctions, too, can have a significant deterrent and punitive effect. In
the absence of multilateral coercive action, unilateral political and eco-
nomic sanctions are probably the most effective means of enforcing
State adherence to human rights norms that are currently available.
Even so, as the case of South Africa illustrates, in practice such sanctions
have enjoyed little success in deterring human rights abuses. 66
The option of breaching an agreement as a political response to a
treaty partner's human rights violations is particularly problematic. The
advantages of such an action are apparent: the concerned State cleanly
severs its ties to a regime it finds objectionable; its political statement is
consistent and unambiguous. The concerned State, however, will itself
be violating international norms if it breaches an obligation as a protest
against human rights violations. 67 A concerned State thus faces a
dilemma. It can condemn the violator State, but continue treaty rela-
tions, thereby diminishing the force of the condemnation. Or it can
breach a treaty altogether, in which case it runs the risk of itself violating
international law.
States concerned about human rights violations need more choices.
In certain cases, the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances
may offer a useful alternative strategy.
III. Fundamental Change of Circumstances Doctrine in Treaty Law
The fundamental change of circumstances doctrine provides a vehicle
for severing treaty relations with an objectionable regime without violat-
ing international law. Where it applies, the doctrine avoids the "breach
65. These measures are known by the technical legal term "retorsion." See L.
HENKIN, supra note 4. For a refutation of the claim that the presence of enforcement
provisions in a human rights agreement precludes a signatory State from imposing
sanctions outside of those provided in the agreement, see Henkin, supra note 3, at 29-
33.
66. See, e.g., Wright, Comprehensive International Sanctions Against South Africa, AFRICA
TODAY, at 5-24 (2d & 3d qtrs. 1986).
67. International law holds a clear presumption against the breach of interna-
tional obligations. A State's breach is excused if it is in response to a treaty partner's
breach of obligation and satisfies the elements for reprisals, reciprocal measures or
retorsion. See L. HENKIN, supra note 4. Ifa State violates the human rights of its own
citizens, a concerned State's breach of a treaty unrelated to human rights will not
meet any of the three exceptions. See id.
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or condone" dilemma that States seeking to punish human rights viola-
tors have traditionally faced.
A. History of Doctrine
The concept of a subsequent change in circumstances altering obliga-
tions arising from an agreement is of ancient origin, probably from early
Roman Canon law. 68 Over time domestic legal systems embraced the
concept and by the sixteenth century, scholars had incorporated a form
of the change of circumstances doctrine into early treatises on interna-
tional law. 69 While scattered examples of States disavowing treaties on
grounds of changed circumstances appear as early as the sixteenth cen-
tury,70 only in the latter half of the nineteenth century did States begin
to assert regularly a change of circumstances to terminate or seek modi-
fication of treaty relations. 7 1 During the pre-World War I period, States
frequently abused the doctrine by invoking it to escape inconvenient or
burdensome international obligations. 72 For this reason, the doctrine
fell into disfavor among scholars because of the excessive risk it posed to
the security of treaties. 73 States, however, continued to invoke the doc-
trine through the inter-war period and beyond. 74
In the late 1940s, the International Law Commission ["the Commis-
sion"] began to advocate the inclusion of a revised version of the change
of circumstances doctrine in its codification of the law of treaties. The
resulting 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties7 5-with arti-
cle 62 on "Fundamental Change of Circumstances" 76-established the
68. Haraszti, supra note 9, at 10-13. For a more detailed discussion of the origin
and early history of change of circumstances doctrine, see Toth, supra note 9, at 58-
62.
69. See Toth, supra note 9, at 58-62. For example, Gentili, the first publicist to
include the doctrine in an international law treatise, maintained that a treaty need not
be performed when "the conditions of affairs is changed, if the change could not be
foreseen." Haraszti, supra note 9, at 10.
70. See Toth, supra note 9, at 148 n.2.
71. See id. at 148-52 (citing examples). See also A. DAVID, supra note 9, at 1-29.
72. I. SINCLAIR, supra note 9, at 193.
73. Id.
74. See Toth, supra note 9, at 150 n.6 (citing examples). For a detailed discussion
of the evolution of the doctrine through the mid-1920s, see Garner, The Doctrine of
Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Termination of Treaties, 21 AM.J. INT'L L. 509 (1927).
75. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969)
(hereinafter "Convention"].
76. Id., 63 AM.J. INT'L L. at 894-95. Article 62 reads:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard
to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was
not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminat-
ing or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of
the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obli-
gations still to be performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground
for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
(a) if the treaty established a boundary; or
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modem formulation of change of circumstances doctrine in treaty law.
B. The Vienna Convention and Fundamental Change of
Circumstances
1. Elements and Scope of Article 62
Article 62 empowers a State to call for termination or suspension of a
treaty if the alleged change and the underlying circumstances meet five
limiting conditions:
-the change must be of a fundamental character;
-the change must have been unforeseen;
-the circumstances which have changed must have been "an essen-
tial basis of the consent to be bound by the treaty";
-the effect of the change must be to transform radically the extent of
the obligations of the party invoking the change as a ground of termina-
tion; and
-the obligations in question must still have to be performed under
the treaty. 77
The Commission clearly intended that these conditions should be diffi-
cult to satisfy, thereby preserving the "exceptional" character of the
doctrine. 78 Beyond this guidance, however, the "legislative history"
sheds little light on the precise meaning or scope of the five
conditions.7 9
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party
invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other
international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.
3. If, under the foregoing principles, a party may invoke a fundamental
change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing
from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending
the operation of the treaty.
77. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Eighteenth
session, U.N. Doc. A16309/Rev. 1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. INr'L L.
COMM'N 259 [hereinafter YBILG], U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser. A/1966/ Add. 1.
78. Id., 2 YBILG at 259. "The Commission attached great importance to the
strict formulation of these conditions... [a]nd emphasize[d] the exceptional charac-
ter [of the rule] by framing the article in negative form."
79. See Lissitzyn, supra note 9. Lissitzyn sharply criticized the Commission for
including terms with ambiguous meanings-e.g., "fundamental change," "not fore-
seen by the parties," "essential basis of the consent to be bound" and "radically to
transform the extent of obligations to be performed"-without defining them. Id. at
915. A. DAVID, supra note 9, similarly attacked the rule drafters for setting forth the
rule "without empirical reference or connection to preferred goals and clarified poli-
cies" and concluded "[w]hat is wrong with this article? Nothing is right." Id. at 44-
45. Several scholars have attempted to define the key terms in article 62. For exam-
ple, Toth, supra note 9, defines the key terms in article 62 as follows:
--"not foreseen by parties" means that the change was not foreseen or
anticipated by a party when the treaty was entered into, or that the change
was not expressly or impliedly provided for in the treaty; a party is not
barred from asserting the doctrine where the change was "objectively fore-
seeable" but not actually foreseen.
Id. at 266.
-"essential basis of the consent to be bound" has two meanings, one sub-jective, the other objective. The subjective component refers to circum-
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The Commission asserted that article 62 constituted an "objective
rule of law by which, on grounds of equity and justice," a State could call
for termination of a treaty.8 0 It rejected the traditional "implied term"
justification of the doctrine8 ' supported by many scholars8 2 because this
stances on which the parties had a "common intention" at the time the treaty
was concluded, the presence or absence of which were "essential" to the per-
formance of the treaty. The objective component refers to circumstances
present at the time the parties concluded the treaty which were also essential
to the treaty even though the parties did not realize their importance at the
time. Although it may seem counter-intuitive for a factor to be essential to
the parties' consent to be bound but not taken into account by the parties at
the time of contracting, the parties may have taken the existence of the condi-
tion for granted or assumed as self-evident that the condition would exist
without change. Equating the "essential basis" provision to include only fac-
tors on which the parties had a "meeting of the minds" would lower article
62 to a mere device for treaty interpretation and remove from the article's
reach the cases in which it has the most utility.
Id. at 265-69.
-"fundamental change" refers to a change of sufficient magnitude to pre-
vent the "object and purpose" of the treaty from being accomplished.
Id. at 269.
--"radically to transform the scope of obligations to be performed" may be
tested through three inter-related questions
1. Did the change render performance of the obligation "essentially dif-
ferent" from that which was originally undertaken in the treaty?;
2. Did the change upset the original balance of mutual performances in
an excessive manner going beyond risk of the contract?;
3. Does performance impose on the invoking State an "intolerable bur-
den" or an "unreasonable sacrifice" not contemplated under the treaty?
Id at 269.
80. YBILC, supra note 77 at 258. In support of its decision to formulate the
change of circumstances article as an objective rule of law, the Commission's Special
Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock stated that "[iun most cases the parties gave no
thought to the possibility of a change of circumstances and, if they had done so,
would probably have provided for it in a different manner." Id. Despite the Commis-
sion's preference for an "objective rule" formulation, article 62 takes into account
the parties' intentions through the "essential basis of the consent of the parties to be
bound by the treaty" language in section (1)(a). Lissitzyn, supra note 9, criticized the
Commission's distinction of "objective" and "subjective" rules as confusing and "not
explicitly or adequately explained." Id. at 913-15.
81. Under the "implied term"justification, the law creates a presumption that the
parties intended that the agreement automatically terminate if circumstances
changed in an unforeseeable manner subsequent to the treaty's conclusion. Thus,
either party could invoke the doctrine to terminate the treaty unless the other State
could rebut the presumption through proof of intent to exclude such a means of
termination at the time the treaty was concluded. The implied term theory treats the
changed circumstances doctrine as an issue of treaty interpretation, with the intent of
the parties, presumed or actual, determining whether the doctrine could be invoked.
82. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 153 (1965) (Rebus "is a rule of interpretation designed to ascertain
the intended obligations of the parties rather than a principle that relieves a party
from performing its obligations"); see also Lissitzyn, supra note 9 (suggesting that the
intention of the parties approach is superior to the Commission's approach). Hill,
The Doctrine of "Rebus Sic Stantibus" in International Law, 9 THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
STUDIES QUARTERLY No. 3 (1934); Harvard Research in International Law, Law of
Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 653, 1096-1126 (1935) (Draft Article on "Rebus
Sic Stantibus" and accompanying comments, based on an intention of the parties
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increased the risk of "subjective interpretation and abuse."8 3
Article 62 does not apply to certain categories of treaties. The arti-
cle expressly excludes from its scope treaties creating a boundary 4 and
disputes in which the invoking State's breach of an international obliga-
tion caused the asserted change in circumstances.8 5 The article also
impliedly excludes some treaties from its reach. For example, while the
Commission refused to limit application of the doctrine to perpetual or
long term treaties, the Special Rapporteur commented that article 62
"would seldom or never have relevance for treaties of limited duration
or which are terminable upon notice." 8 6
Article 62 also disqualifies certain types of change of circumstances
claims. For example, a State cannot invoke the doctrine if its obligations
under the treaty are fully executed, since the doctrine requires duties
"still to be performed under the treaty. '8 7 Moreover, if a treaty
includes a provision contemplating that the human rights situation
might radically change, the State could not invoke the change of circum-
stances doctrine since the parties foresaw the potential for change.8 8
International law doctrines also may affect the legality of a funda-
mental change of circumstances assertion. Because States may derogate
by treaty from the application of fundamental change of circumstances,
the article will not apply where the contracting States explicitly or
implicitly exclude the possibility of its application in the treaty.8 9
2. Purposes of Article 62
The Commission advanced two interrelated policy rationales for includ-
ing a rule on fundamental change of circumstances in its codification of
the law of treaties. The Commission's primary purpose in drafting arti-
cle 62 was to encourage and facilitate peaceful change by creating a
"safety valve" in treaty relations.
A treaty may remain in force for a long time and its stipulations come
to place an undue burden on one of the parties as a result of a fundamen-
tal change of circumstances. Then, if the other party were obdurate in
opposing any change, the fact that international law recognized no legal
means of terminating or modifying the treaty otherwise than through a
further agreement between the same parties might impose a serious
strain on the relations between the States concerned; and the dissatisfied
State might ultimately be driven to take action outside the law.9 0
approach). But see RESTATEMENT (REviSED) supra note 48, which follows article 62 in
formulating fundamental change of circumstances as an objective rule of law.
83. See supra note 80.
84. Convention at art. 62(2)(a), supra note 75, at 894.
85. Id. Art. 62 (2)(b).
86. YBILC, supra note 77, at 259.
87. See L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 492.
88. Id.
89. See Toth, supra note 9, at 264: "The rule will not apply if the parties expressly
excluded the possibility of its application ..
90. YBILC, supra note 77, at 258.
Vol. 22
1989 Fundamental Change of Circumstances
Article 62 serves either "to induce a spirit of compromise in the other
party," 9' or "at least to secure a solution by legal means."'9 2
The Commission also sought to preserve the security of treaties.
While it might appear counter-intuitive to preserve treaty security by
providing a means of escaping international obligations, one commenta-
tor noted:
Since it is impossible to bring to an end the centuries old practice of gov-
ernments claiming a fundamental change of circumstances in order to
free themselves from burdensome treaty obligations, the course recom-
mended by the... Commission... to regularize the practice and at the
same time to regulate it, seems to recommend itself.93
3. Procedural Requirements for Invoking Article 62
The Convention requires a State invoking article 62 to follow proce-
dural requirements set forth in articles 65 and 66.94 In brief, these rules
mandate: (1) that the invoking State give notice to the other party; and
(2) if the other party objects, that the parties are obligated to seek a
solution to the dispute through measures contained in article 33 of the
U.N. Charter.9 5 If these measures fail to lead to a settlement within 12
months after the other party objects, either party may call for a Concilia-
tion procedure described in an Annex to the Vienna Convention. 9 6
As noted above, article 62 empowers the invoking State only to call
for termination of the treaty. International law will not recognize the
termination unless one of three events occurs: (1) the treaty partner
expressly or by default accedes to termination; (2) an international tri-
bunal rules that the circumstances meet the article 62 conditions; or (3)
91. Id.
92. T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 121 (1974).
93. Schwelb, Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 29 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLXNDIS-
CHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 39, 69 (1969).
94. See id. at 60: "Attached to the present article... [are] the specific procedural
safeguards set out in [arts. 65 and 66]." The Convention also applies the same pro-
cedural rules to all other grounds of invalidity, termination or suspension of a treaty.
Such grounds include error, fraud, corruption of a State official, coercion, conflict
with a peremptory norm of international law ("us cogens), conclusion of an inconsistent
later treaty, material breach, and supervening impossibility of performance.
95. Convention, at art. 65(1), supra note 75, at 895. Article 33 of the U.N. Charter
refers to the following dispute resolution mechanisms: "negotiation, enquiry, media-
tion, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." U.N. CHARTER, at art.
33.
96. Convention, at art. 66(b), supra note 75, at 896. The Annex establishes
grounds for selecting a five-person Conciliation Commission to hear the dispute.
The Commission makes only non-binding recommendations for settling the dispute.
Nevertheless, in the great majority of cases the suggestions of the Commission will
carry great weight. Rosenne, The Settlement of Treaty Disputes Under the Vienna Convention
of 1969, 31 ZErrsCHRIFr FOR AusLXNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKER-
RECHT 1, 60-61 (1971). Although many delegates to the Vienna Convention sought
compulsory jurisdiction of either the International Court ofJustice or a newly consti-
tuted group over change of circumstances disputes, these delegates failed to win
approval of such a provision. See A. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 9, at 148.
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the invoking State in good faith fulfills all procedural requirements set
forth in article 65 and the parties still fail to reach an agreement over the
dispute.9 7 Some scholars argue that the third event provides an open
door for States to abuse the doctrine. As the Commission's Special Rap-
porteur noted, "the risks to the security of treaties which this doctrine
presents in the absence of any general system of compulsory jurisdiction
are obvious." 98 These risks are ameliorated by the fact that bad faith
invocation of the doctrine or bad faith refusal to negotiate a solution
will, upon termination, constitute a breach of the treaty; the injured
State may then seek reparations or take retaliatory measures authorized
by international law. 99
4. Legal Effect of Article 62 Termination or Suspension
Substantively, a treaty's legal termination under article 62 releases the
parties from further performance of obligations under the agreement as
of the date it is lawfully established that article 62 applies.10 0 Alterna-
tively, if the party invoking article 62 merely suspends performance, the
treaty remains in force, but the parties are released from performing
obligations during the suspension period.' 0 1
C. The Status of Article 62 in International Law
The article 62 fundamental change of circumstances provision presently
governs disputes among the more than 50 States that are parties to the
Vienna Convention.' 0 2 The Convention entered into effect in 1980.103
The effect of article 62 and the Vienna Convention on non-signa-
tory States is less clear. Scholars have argued that much of the Vienna
Convention represents a codification of customary law and therefore
binds all States-including non-signatories.' 0 4 Unfortunately, no con-
sensus exists that article 62 codified customary law rather than new law
that one must examine for customary usage on its own merits.10 5 Evi-
97. See Haraszti, supra note 9, at 83-87.
98. YBILC, supra note 77, at 257.
99. Haraszti, supra note 9, at 86.
100. Convention, at art. 70(1)(a), supra note 75. Termination, however, "does not
affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execu-
tion of the treaty prior to termination." Id. at art. 70(1)(b).
101. Convention, at art. 72(1), supra note 75. Under the Vienna Convention, par-
ties under a suspended treaty must refrain from acts obstructing the resumption of
the operation of the treaty. Id. at art. 72(2).
102. A. VAMvouicos, supra note 9, at 139. For a list of the parties to the Vienna
Convention, see MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL,
1988, at 767, U.N. Doc. ST/LE6/SER.E6, U.N. Sales No. E.88.v.3 (1988).
103. I. SINCLAIR, supra note 9, at I.
104. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 387.
105. A. VAMvouxos, supra note 9, at 150-51; Toth, supra note 9, at 170; and
Haraszti, supra note 9, at 46 all assert that the article 62 codification of changed cir-
cumstances constitutes a customary international law norm. This cannot be consid-
ered settled because no court, international or otherwise, has either accepted a
State's invocation of change of circumstances as being legal, Toth, supra note 9, at
171, or stated that fundamental change of circumstances constitutes an international
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dence that the article 62 formulation binds all States is found in the Fish-
eries Jurisdiction Cases,10 6 the first and only change of circumstances
dispute decided by an international tribunal since the Convention's pro-
mulgation. In Fisheries, the International Court of Justice clearly recog-
nized the existence of the article 62 formulation of fundamental change
of circumstances as a rule of general international law, 10 7 even though it
held the doctrine inapplicable to the facts of the dispute. 108
IV. Human Rights Violations as Grounds for Fundamental Change of
Circumstances Treaty Suspension or Termination
A. Legality of Human Rights Violations Serving as Grounds for
Applying Fundamental Change of Circumstances
Although the underdeveloped State of both international human rights
law and fundamental change of circumstances doctrine make a conclu-
sive answer difficult, no legal impediments appear to bar human rights
violations from serving as grounds for terminating or suspending a
treaty. By its terms, article 62 does not expressly exclude human rights
violations from its scope. Nothing in the text or legislative history sup-
ports a claim that the human rights violations are implicitly beyond the
article's reach. While a State may have difficulty proving that human
rights violations meet all of article 62's limiting conditions-particularly
the requirements that the change be "fundamental" and that the
absence of human rights violations was an essential basis of the consent
to be bound-the factual circumstances in which human rights violations
occur do not appear inherently incompatible with article 62's
requirements.
Similarly, no human rights law doctrines conclusively affect the
validity of a change of circumstances claim. Scholars, however, have
law norm. YBILC, supra note 77, at 258. Several International Court of Justice
majority and individual opinions have, however, commented favorably on the nature
of the doctrine as customary law, yet refused to hold it applicable to the facts before
them. See id. at 171-78. One may explain the absence ofjudicial holdings on several
grounds including judicial reluctance to encourage a doctrine historically subject to
widespread abuse. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text, in conjunction with
the possibility that strong change of circumstances claims are acceded to without
litigation.
106. United Kingdom v. Iceland, 1973 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 2, 1973), reprinted
in 12 I.L.M. 290 (1973). See also the companion case, Federal Republic of Germany v.
Iceland, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 300 (1973) (decided on the same day). The two judg-
ments are in most respects identical. The disputes involved treaties that recognized
Iceland's 12-mile exclusive fishing limit in return for Iceland's agreement that the
International Court ofJustice would decide any future dispute concerning Iceland's
efforts to further extend its fishing limits. When Iceland extended its fishing limits to
200 miles in accordance with subsequent State practice, England and Germany
invoked the compromissory clause triggering the jurisdiction of the Court. Iceland
contested the validity of the Court's jurisdiction on the grounds that changes in fish-
ing technology and the international law governing fishing limits rendered the earlier
treaties obsolete and void.
107. Toth, supra note 9, at 176.
108. 12 I.L.M. at 298-99.
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identified two potential impediments to sanctions against a State that
violates the human rights of its citizens. The first potential barrier is
exclusivity of remedies. Some scholars have argued that when human
rights agreements contain complaint or remedy provisions, signatories
seeking to take action in response to a treaty partner's human rights
violations are limited to those provisions;' 0 9 alternatively, a State must
exhaust such procedures as a condition precedent to taking additional
measures.1 0 The problem with this argument is that except for article
62 of the European Convention on Human Rights,"' no human rights
agreement expressly or by clear implication states that its complaint pro-
visions are intended to be exclusive. Under international law, States are
generally allowed to take any action unless a countervailing legal princi-
ple prohibits it."12 Unless and until human rights agreements demand
exclusivity of remedies, such arguments should not prevent a State from
invoking change of circumstances or taking other action available under
international law in response to human rights violations.
The more difficult barrier to applying the change of circumstances
doctrine involves the "domestic jurisdiction" clause of the U.N. Charter.
The Charter, at article 2(7), states that "[n]othing in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." 13 The Char-
ter does not define "domestic jurisdiction" and many scholars have
debated whether it prevents concerned States from taking action against
States that violate the human rights of their own citizens. 114 The mean-
ing of the domestic jurisdiction clause has never been litigated in inter-
national courts.11 5  Suriname impliedly asserted the domestic
jurisdiction defense when it claimed that the Netherlands had unlawfully
109. See Bastid, Observations as to the Consequences on the International Plane of Failure to
Respect Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI
ACCORD 41 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977).
110. See Frowein, The Interrelationship Between Helsinki's Final Act, The International
Covenants on Human Rights, and The European Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 30-31 (T. Buergenthal ed.
1977).
111. Reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 36, at
500.11.
112. See Henkin, supra note 3, at 30-31.
113. U.N. CIRTER art. 2(7). See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 4.
114. Compare L. HENKIN, supra note 4 (arguing for limited scope of domestic juris-
diction clause), accord Bossuyt, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in Domestic Matters,
35 INT'L COMM'NJURISTS REv. 45, 50-52 (1985), with Watson, Autointerpretation, Compe-
tence and the Continuing Validity of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 60
(1977).
115. The International Court ofJustice dealt indirectly with the domestic jurisdic-
tion clause when it held that all States have an erga omnes interest in protecting "basic
rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimina-
tion." Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Lim-
ited, 9 I.L.M. 227, 259 (1970). To the extent a State's human rights violation
constitutes an erga omnes interest of all States, domestic jurisdiction will not prevent
international measures against the violator.
Vol 22
1989 Fundamental Change of Circumstances
intervened in its internal affairs."16
International tribunals have not yet provided a conclusive interpre-
tation of the Charter's domestic jurisdiction clause. Nevertheless, sev-
eral factors suggest that in most cases the clause would not bar a State
from asserting the change of circumstances doctrine based on human
rights violations. By its terms, article 2(7) only prohibits intervention by
the U.N. itself and does not address actions by individual States. Even if
international courts were to adopt an interpretation of the domestic
jurisdiction clause that encompassed unilateral State action, it would
probably not bar all actions taken in response to human rights viola-
tions. 117 The U.N. itself asserts authority to take measures when a State
is guilty of "consistent patterns of gross violations" of human rights" l8
and the International Court ofJustice has endorsed international meas-
ures against States that violate "basic rights of the human person," even
if the violations occur internally.I t 9 Finally, Professor Henkin argues
that by signing a human rights agreement, a State "internationalizes" its
citizens' human rights, in effect estopping it from asserting the domestic
jurisdiction clause as a defense to sanctions. 120 For all of these reasons,
the domestic jurisdiction clause should not provide an effective defense
to most assertions of change of circumstances.
B. Potential Utility of Invoking Fundamental Change of
Circumstances Against a Treaty Partner
1. Potential Benefits
Use of fundamental change of circumstances doctrine in human rights
cases provides benefits to both the State seeking redress and the inter-
national community generally. First, the State invoking the doctrine
avoids the "breach or condone" dilemma discussed above. It publicly
interposes a legal barrier between itself and the violating State, avoiding
the appearance of supporting an abhorrent regime and preventing the
legal relationship from undermining the force of other political, legal, or
economic efforts. At the same time, as long as the invoking State acts
and negotiates in good faith, it should not be automatically liable for
reparations or suffer other consequences associated with the breach of
an international obligation.12 '
Second, the fundamental change of circumstances doctrine may
advance human rights law by providing an entrance into international
116. See supra text accompanying note 7.
117. See Henkin, supra note 3, at 33: "As blanket objections to international con-
cern with human rights, the claims of domestic jurisdiction and non-intervention
have been long dead."
118. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES
§ 702 (1986) which asserts that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of
State policy, it practices, encourages or condones ... consistent patterns of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights."
119. See supra note 115.
120. See Henkin, supra note 3, at 35.
121. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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courts for human rights related litigation. A State invoking the doctrine
gains the right to terminate the treaty if the other State does not protest.
If it wishes to preserve the treaty, the alleged violator State must sue. By
invoking the doctrine, therefore, the complaining States may succeed in
forcing the accused State into court. Litigation would provide courts
with an opportunity to clarify such hotly debated terms as "domestic
jurisdiction,"1 2 2 "basic rights of the human person,"' 123 and "gross and
consistent violations of human rights."' 124
Finally, the use of fundamental change of circumstances based on
human rights violations may also foster improved international relations
through its function as a "safety valve" between treaty partners. One
can argue strongly that it is better to allow States bound by treaty to a
State committing heinous crimes to seek legal termination of their rela-
tions than to compel them to breach the agreement or, more danger-
ously, take extra-legal measures against the offending government to
remove the source of its irritation.' 25 Moreover, the doctrine channels
acrimonious international disputes into a regularized dispute resolution
process that discourages outright breach.' 2 6
2. Potential Costs
Despite its benefits, application of the change of circumstances doctrine
against a treaty partner involves at least three possible drawbacks. First,
the invoking State must be prepared to pay the potential economic and
political costs of losing should the accused party contest the claim and
win. The courts' historic dislike of the doctrine, 12 7 combined with the
difficulty of meeting article 62's exacting conditions, create a relatively
high possibility that an accused State's defenses will succeed in litiga-
tion. Of course, this risk is somewhat mitigated by an important strate-
gic advantage of the invoking States; namely, the violating State may
decline to contest the claim in order to avoid drawing public attention to
its human rights problems.
Second, the underdeveloped state of change of circumstances law
decreases the certainty with which the concerned State can invoke the
doctrine. Until case law develops, States contemplating use of the doc-
trine will have no basis for determining what facts will satisfy article 62's
exacting yet ambiguous requirements. At best, the invoking State can
seek to ensure that the circumstances do not violate express or clearly
implied conditions for invoking the doctrine and that the circumstances
provide the strongest possible equitable case in favor of granting relief.
122. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 115.
124. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
125. Wider adoption of the doctrine conceivably may have the unintended benefit
of encouraging States to enter international accords by providing a legal means for
severing ties should a treaty partner unexpectedly act in an abhorrent manner at
some point in the future.
126. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 105.
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The third, and perhaps most important potential cost involves pos-
sible abuse of the doctrine. Allowing the use of the doctrine of funda-
mental change of circumstances based on human rights violations
creates a heightened risk that States will invoke the doctrine as a pretext
for escaping an inconvenient obligation or for illegitimate political rea-
sons. The checkered history of the doctrine underscores the reality of
this threat.128 The powerful reactions which allegations of human rights
violations typically evoke suggest that abuse of the doctrine could create
significant international tension. At worst, abuse could disturb the frag-
ile consensus developed over the last 40 years that human rights are a
legitimate object of international concern.
3. Evaluation of Benefits and Costs
On balance, the potential benefits of using fundamental change of cir-
cumstances doctrine against human rights violators outweigh the accom-
panying risks. Significant checks lessen the likelihood of abusive
invocation of the doctrine. The most important safeguard is the restric-
tive formulation of article 62. Meeting the article's stringent require-
ments will require more than a mere assertion of fundamental change of
circumstances.
International courts offer a second check on potential abuse. While
States may generally be hesitant to appear in a public tribunal to defend
against charges of human rights abuse, such reluctance is not without
limits. Wrongly accused States may actively seek public exoneration,
particularly when they derive important benefits from the treaty. And
once the wrongly accused State initiates litigation, underlying judicial
suspicion of the change of cirumstances doctrine will further diminish
the likelihood that bad faith claims will succeed.
V. Application of Analysis to Suriname/Netherlands Dispute
The Suriname/Netherlands dispute represents a paradigm case for
invoking fundamental change of circumstances doctrine. Given the cur-
rent absence of directly applicable judicial rulings, the case should serve
as a benchmark for States considering application of the doctrine.
The facts of the case do not appear to contravene any express or
implied condition for invoking the article. The dispute did not involve a
boundary. 129 Breach by the Netherlands did not cause the change in
circumstances.1 3 0 The treaty was not terminable at will,' 3 1 or fully exe-
cuted.13 2 It did not expressly or implicitly provide for changes in
human rights' 3 3 or exclude application of the change of circumstances
128. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. In 1982, the Development Cooper-
ation Plan treaty had three to eight years left to run. See supra note 20.
133. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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The facts also at least arguably and perhaps strongly satisfy the ele-
ments of article 62. Given the ambiguous wording of article 62, it is
impossible to predict whether a court would hold that the continuation
of respect for human rights in Suriname was an "essential condition of
the consent to be bound."' 3 5 The statement of object and purpose of
the development aid treaty does not explicitly discuss human rights as
fundamental to the treaty relationship. Nevertheless, the facts indicate
that the Netherlands did consider the future maintenance of human
rights to be essential. Most importantly, the Netherlands refused to
sever ties with its former colony until Suriname agreed to adopt a consti-
tution guaranteeing citizens human rights.1 36 The guarantee of human
rights, therefore, was arguably an essential pre-condition to the inde-
pendence treaties, including the Development Cooperation Plan.
The Netherlands also meets article 62's requirement that the
change be unforseen. Suriname had no history of human rights viola-
tions prior to or contemporaneous with the conclusion of the indepen-
dence treaties.1 3 7 It would be unreasonable to suggest that a coup d'tat
followed by systematic, violent elimination of the opposition could have
been foreseen seven years before the event.
The final important inquiry under article 62 concerns the question
of whether Suriname's human rights violations were "fundamental" vis-
a-vis the treaty and whether they "radically transformed the scope of the
obligations to be performed under the treaty." One can make a strong
argument that the coup and the subsequent gross human rights viola-
tions did represent a fundamental change, radically altering the extent
of the Netherlands' treaty obligations. The Netherlands entered the
treaty promising to provide development assistance to a democratic
State with constitutional guarantees on human rights. After the coup,
continuation of the treaty's obligations would have forced the Nether-
lands to subsidize a regime guilty of torture, murder, and various other
violations of human rights. The change in regimes was clearly funda-
mental.13 8 The obligation of supporting such a regime is radically dif-
ferent from the obligation the Netherlands agreed to undertake.
Beyond meeting the prima facie elements of an article 62 change of
circumstances claim, no evidence indicates any bad faith on the part of
the Netherlands. In fact, the Netherlands demonstrated good faith by
agreeing to suspend, not terminate, the agreement and by offering to
resume performance if Suriname gave guarantees of future adherence to
134. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 21.
136. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
138. The relatively small number of victims should not by itself preclude applica-
tion of the article given the small population of Suriname, its long history of vio-
lence-free government, and the careful selection of victims. Bossuyt & Griffiths, supra
note 7, at 62.
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basic human rights principles.1 39
In sum, the Netherlands/Suriname dispute presents a paradigm
case for application of the fundamental change of circumstances doc-
trine in a human rights context.
Conclusion
The implementation of human rights norms has not been effective
because States too often lack the inclination to respond to violations.
When they do decide to act, concerned States face barriers that weaken
their ability to sanction effectively the violating State. Where it is appli-
cable, the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances offers a
potentially effective vehicle for punishing offensive States and for
increasing future deterrence.
Because of the uncertainties concerning the legality and scope of
the fundamental change of circumstances doctrine, a State should
invoke it in the human rights context only when: (1) the circumstances
underlying the violations appear to meet the article 62 requirements and
do not contravene express or clearly implied prohibitions on its use; (2)
the violations involved are sufficiently "gross and consistent" so that the
equities of the situation demand relief; (3) the State is able and willing
to suffer the consequences of breach should the claim be challenged and
rejected; and (4) it invokes the doctrine with the good faith belief that
the treaty relationship has fundamentally changed and not for economic
or political gain.
In an area where international law often appears to offer few mean-
ingful methods for punishing transgressors, use of the fundamental
change of circumstances doctrine may provide the basis for effective,
affirmative action.
Robert J. Munnelly, Jr.
139. See Bossuyt & Griffiths, supra note 7 and accompanying text.

